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Uttering “facts are passé” captures the spirit of post-truth. 
However, it often leads to addressing facts rather than why 
they pass off as passé. “Post-truth” was dubbed the 2016 
Word of the Year due to its increased usage during the Brexit 
referendum and the US presidential election in the same year. 
The issue presses at least twenty-six countries, including the 
Philippines, as they face widespread disinformation and 
misinformation. This paper offers an overview of the social 
media manipulation from Samantha Bradshaw and Philip 
Howard, and networked disinformation in the Philippines 
from Jonathan Corpus Ong and Jason Vincent Cabañes. This 
paper also draws from the definitions of Claire Laybats, Luke 
Tredinnick, and Kathleen Higgins and investigates Michel  
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Foucault’s insights on stultitia and flattery in relation to 
controlled interactivity and volatile virality. The content of 
post-truth is enriched by the discussion of the internet 
medium. Marshall McLuhan’s “the medium is the message” 
and “global village” are used to explore the key shifts and 
the unanticipated consequences that ensured post-truth’s 
arrival. Lastly, the Hellenistic model of self-care is explored 
as an ethical response to the post-truth attitude as it 
addresses stultitia and flattery with the exercises of mathesis 
and askesis. 
Keywords: askesis, care of the self, ethics, fake news, Foucault, 
mathesis, post-truth, social media, stultitia 
 
 
I. The Advent of Fake News  
he bane of fake news defined as “a false story or headline 
written, published, and designed to look like a real news 
online”1 rose to an alarming scale that prodded policymakers, 
journalists, educators, and civil society organizations to huddle 
together. They confront a disinformation economy of a 
strategically-placed supply and a vigorous demand. Propaganda 
machines are operated by state-funded assembly lines of 
 








“cyber troops and bots” used for social media manipulation.2 
They are managed by “architects of disinformation” or 
advertising and PR strategists,3 who are using a filter bubble 
social media platform to target netizens who are indifferent to 
facts.  
Solutions have been proposed. Scientists and philosophers 
are urged to “speak up when scientific findings are ignored by 
those in power or treated as mere matters of faith.”4 Nora 
Martin writes about “digital natives” having the “need to 
develop critical thinking skills in order to evaluate media 
content.”5 Melissa Zimdars came up with a list of websites and 
website types she calls False, Misleading, Clickbait-y, and/or 
Satirical ‘News’ Sources.6 A thrust in information literacy is 
emphasized by Rochlin in his article “Fake News: Belief in 
 
2  Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, “Troops, Trolls and 
Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Social Media Manipulation,” COMPROP 
Working Paper Series 12 (2017). http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/89/2017/07/Troops-Trolls-and-Troublemakers.pdf. 
3 Jonathan Corpus Ong and Jason Vincent Cabañes, “Architects of 
Networked Disinformation: Behind the Scenes of Troll Accounts and Fake 
News Production in the Philippines” (Newton Tech4Dev Network, 2019). 
http://newtontechfordev.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ARCHITECTS-
OF-NETWORKED-DISINFORMATION-FULL-REPORT.pdf. 
4 Kathleen Higgins, “Post-Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed,” Nature 540, no. 
9 (November 2016). https://www.nature.com/news/post-truth-a-guide-for-the-
perplexed-1.21054. 
5 Nora Martin, “Journalism, the Pressures of Verification and Notions of 
Post-truth in Civil Society,” Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 9, 
no. 2(2017): 42. http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs/article/view/ 
5476/6102.   
6 Melissa Zimdars, “False, Misleading, Clickbait-y, and/or Satirical “News” 
Sources.” Google Document (2016). https://docs.google.com/document/d/ 
10eA5-mCZLSS4MQY5QGb5ewC3VAL6pLkT53V_81ZyitM/preview.   




Post-Truth.”7 There are also fact-checking organizations like 
FactCheck.org, American Press Institute, and Politifact that 
center on US politics while Snopes focuses on urban legends, 
celebrity rumors, and much more. Tech initiatives like the 
“meta-level crap-detecting engine in the form of an add-on or 
app that provides a reliability estimate for the source of any 
news link” 8  proposed by the University of Nevada’s Hal 
Berghel are also present. Similarly, the National Union of 
Journalists in the Philippines and Center for Media Freedom 
and Responsibility launched Fakeblok. There is also a direct 
collaboration between media groups and Facebook in their 
fact-checking system.9  
In the Philippine context, Jason Vincent Cabañes and 
Jayeel Cornelio zero in on the role of journalists. They 
suggest that either mainstream media outlets present 
supportive and critical perspectives on the Duterte 
administration side by side or be “clear about their partisan 
leanings.” 10  In a later and more exhaustive work about 
networked disinformation, Ong and Cabañes11 recommended  
 
 
7 Rochlin, “Fake News.”  
8 Hal Berghel, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Fake News,” Computer 50, no. 2 (February 
2017): 83. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7842838/?part=1. 
9  Sam Levin, “Facebook Promised to Tackle Fake News. But the 
Evidence Shows It's Not Working,” The Guardian, May 16, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/16/facebook-fake-news-
tools-not-working.   
10 Jason Vincent Cabañes and Jayeel S. Cornelio, “The Rise of Trolls in the 
Philippines (and What We Can Do About It),” in A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays 
on Rodrigo Duterte’s Early Presidency (QC: BUGHAW, 2017), 244. 
11 Ong and Cabañes, Architects of Networked Disinformation. 




political campaign finance regulation, news media coverage 
and investigative reportage of fake news and trolling, 
platform intermediary regulation responding to particular 
concerns of fragile democracies in the global South, and the 
self-regulation of advertising and the personal relations 
industry. 
The suggested and implemented recourses emphasize the 
role of the media, the government, the owners and managers 
of social media platforms, and the users themselves. The 
dedication of fact-checking organizations, the capacity to craft 
comprehensive penalizing legislations or the ability to develop 
a highly complex algorithm to act as a spam filter, and the 
commitment of journalists and other information professionals 
in conducting skills training for information and media literacy 
all cover an expansive ground. However, such initiatives fail to 
tap a much smaller yet no less crucial space in responding to 
the overwhelming presence of online disinformation and 
misinformation: how one relates to one’s self. 
Self-care 
This philosophical undertaking rethinks the issue in terms 
of the preparation of the netizen’s character in the face of 
disinformation and misinformation. As such, it enriches the 
tech initiatives by focusing on the work needed not only on 
the self but by the self. In the context of post-truth, the 
mentioned political and sociological perspectives offer an 
elaborate account of the shrinking space of freedom. 
However, this paper takes up the challenge of working on a 




responsible practice of freedom, no matter how small its 
space. In this sense, philosophy tasks the netizen to both own 
the discourse he engages in and to own himself.  
In Foucault’s account of the care of the self, a responsible 
practice of freedom necessitates a certain quality of attention 
devoted to one’s thoughts and the actual exercises practiced 
by the self on the self. A practice of ethics entails making a 
considered use of freedom that results in a rigorous work on 
the self as it relates to others. It is the deliberate, considerate, 
and unwavering use of freedom in the care of the self that 
allows an ethical response to the passivity perpetuated by 
post-truth.  
Post-truth refers to an attitude to discourse in which the 
relevance of facts is disregarded in favor of the appeal to 
one’s emotions and personal beliefs. This paper will illustrate 
that two key concepts drawn from Michel Foucault’s 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, stultus and flattery, animate the post-
truth attitude. A stultus is “someone blown by the wind and 
open to the external world . . . to get mixed up in his own 
mind with his passions, desires, ambition, mental habits, 
illusions, etc.”12 A flatterer is “the person that prevents you 
from knowing yourself as you are. . . . Flattery renders the 
person to whom it is directed impotent and blind.”13 The  
 
 
12 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College De 
France 1981-1982, trans. Graham Burchell (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2005), 131. 
13 Ibid., 376. 




aforementioned concepts are amplified in intensity and 
extend to the influence of the internet medium and its 
content. 
Post-truth Attitude 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, post-truth is 
“relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective 
facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than 
appeals to emotion and personal belief.” Claire Laybats and 
Luke Tredinnick wrote that it is “characterized by a willful 
blindness to evidence, a mistrust of authority, and an appeal 
to emotionally based arguments often rooted in fears or 
anxieties.”14  For Kathleen Higgins, “post-truth refers to 
blatant lies being routine across society, and it means 
politicians can lie without condemnation.”15  
In online political discourse, the potency of personal 
beliefs constitutes a “personal reality” that is erroneously 
claimed as an alternative fact.16 It is when “my truth” or “our 
truth” becomes so compelling and self-evident that any 
contrary view, no matter how well-substantiated, will be 
dismissed as a personal attack or simply ignored. It is not just 
 
14 Claire Laybats and Luke Tredinnick, “Post-Truth, Information and Emotion,” 
Business Information Review 33, no. 4 (2016): 204. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ 
abs/10.1177/0266382116680741.   
15 Higgins, “Post-Truth,” 540.  
16 A term mentioned by US Counselor to the President Kellyanne Conway 
during a press briefing on January 22, 2017. It was in reference to the erroneous 
statement of White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer about the number of 
attendees in President Donald Trump’s inauguration. 




about a good story trumping an accurate one. It is “my story” 
or “our story” trumping all others. 
The first definition of post-truth focused on how emotions 
and personal beliefs dislodged the appreciation of objective 
facts. The second definition elaborated its consequences to the 
individual. The third definition referred to the post-truth attitude 
in terms of its consequences to society. Unlike the more general 
character of the two previous definitions, the third explicitly 
situates the post-truth attitude in politics. Higgins’s definition 
zeroes in on either acceptance or indifference to lies spewed by 
politicians because of the public’s lack of condemnation of it. 
Furthermore, she mentions lying as routine across society 
implying that lying is a normalized practice and characterizing 
post-truth not just as a widespread phenomenon but a persistent 
way of thinking or feeling. 
An often-recurring theme in the comments section of a 
news Facebook post includes condescension and ridicule to 
the Diehard Duterte Supporters (DDS) as they are painted as 
mindless fanatics by the administration’s critics. Conversely, 
they view the critics as unpatriotic, pawns of the Liberal 
Party, or Communist rebel sympathizers. It is the potency of 
emotions such as fear, anxiety, or anger that puts one’s hands 
over one’s ears or raises one’s voice to drown out the others’. 
As will be seen in succeeding discussions, this attitude that 
deafens the self is placed in a porous environment where it is 
dangerously cultivated by the self and those who stand to gain 
from it. To lose control of one’s self is the crux of the post-
truth attitude.  




Networked Disinformation in the Philippines 
If disinformation is false information deliberately designed 
to harm, networked disinformation is an organizational 
structure that ensures the delivery of such information. 
Eliciting the post-truth attitude is apparent in the aim of 
disinformation architects to fan the flames of resentment of 
political supporters through the work done by digital 
influencers (who have between 50 thousand to 2 million 
followers on Facebook and Twitter) and community-level 
fake account operators (who manually operate fake profiles to 
infiltrate community groups and news pages but rely 
minimally on automated bots).17  
The campaign design and campaign implementation of 
networked disinformation use two vital principles: controlled 
interactivity and volatile virality. Controlled interactivity is 
“where political campaigners aim to disseminate a common 
script by carefully and strategically putting enthusiastic 
supporters to work as peer-to-peer conduits for organizational 
messages.”18 Volatile virality occurs in “individual operators’ 
attempts to weaponize popular vernaculars to maximize the 
reach of social media posts.”19 
Branding is essential to controlled interactivity. “Branding is 
storytelling elevated to narrative, often embellished with myth 
to enhance a product’s identity. The branding story conveyed 
 
17 Ong and Cabañes, Architects of Networked Disinformation. 
18 Ibid., 45. 
19 Ibid., 46. 




through signs, symbols, and other elements results in a 
manufactured legacy that appeals to consumers.”20 A brand 
bible is a document that contains guidelines that ensure the 
delivery of the product’s enhanced identity and manufactured 
legacy to the public. As such, the brand bible that the public 
relations and advertising executives craft for their politician 
client projects a carefully constructed identity that influences 
the public for political gain.  
Volatile virality’s principal techniques, according to Ong 
and Cabañes,21 include positive branding, digital black ops, 
diversionary tactics, trending, and signal scrambling. Signal 
scrambling will not be discussed in this paper because it is of 
a more technical nature and is irrelevant to the discussion. 
Positive branding focuses on projecting the qualities that 
serve the image that the high-level strategists have designed 
for their client. It highlights the features that put their client 
in a favorable light in line with their personal brand. 
Conversely, digital black ops attack the personal brand of the 
client’s competitor. It is a smear campaign that emphasizes 
putting the concerned party in a completely negative light. 
Both strategies tend to highlight the angle they are focusing 
on, either totally exalting or vilifying the personality in the 
eyes of the public. The use of diversionary tactics entails 
employing an irrelevant point without offering a sound 
 
20 Steven Heller, “Foreword,” in Brand Bible: The Complete Guide to Building, 
Designing, and Sustaining Brands, ed. Debbie Millman (Beverly, MA: Rockport 
Publishers, 2012), 4. 
21 Ong and Cabañes, Architects of Networked Disinformation.  




argument in the discussion. Trending is a technique that 
focuses on core campaign messages. Through Twitter, the 
issues or personalities are reduced to buzz words. The use of 
hashtags makes it easier to find the used buzz words in bulk 
and amplify their social media presence. Coupled with digital 
black ops like #Trilliling or positive branding like 
#DutertePaRin, it tends to zero in on a bottom line statement 
regarding a particular issue or personality.  
The techniques of volatile virality prey on the inability of 
netizens to have enough control over themselves. The 
techniques rely heavily on emotional appeals that lead 
netizens to reinforce their beliefs on supporting or criticizing 
a particular issue or personality in a particular way. Clicking 
share or retweeting the content delivered by such techniques 
tend to worsen the polarization between the critics and the 
supporters.  
Targeting Stultitia and Designing Flattery 
The content of positive branding, digital black ops, 
diversionary tactics, and trending not only amplify but 
cultivate anger across the political spectrum. Divisiveness 
marks the comments section of news articles posted on social 
media where heated exchanges between supporters and critics 
of the current administration occur. It is often seen in the 
quick dismissal of journalistic and scholarly works as biased 
reporting. Such encounters go beyond the plethora of logical 
fallacies or a propensity to embrace alternative sources of 
information (i.e., blog posts, memes) over established media 




outlets. This signals a subtler problem at work that limits the 
possibility of a civil and fruitful online political discourse. 
The concept of stultitia in Michel Foucault’s Hermeneutics of 
the Subject sheds light on the matter. A stultus, someone who 
has not cared for himself, the “raw material” that self-care 
works on, easily partakes in the flatterer’s discourse and loses 
control of itself. A flatterer is “the person that prevents you 
from knowing yourself as you are. . . . Flattery renders the 
person to whom it is directed impotent and blind.” Foucault 
discusses the flatterer 22   in terms of an inferior and a 
superior. The inferior can gain leverage over the superior by 
exaggerating the qualities he possesses, thus misleading him 
and slyly putting him in a weaker status than the inferior. Due 
to the misrepresentation of the superior’s relation to himself, 
the inferior gains power over him. 
Flattery is apparent in online political discourse. Exchanges 
in the comments section would often include the statement 
that supporting President Duterte is “patriotic.” This notion 
of being “patriotic” leads actual supporters to think that their 
love for country is tantamount to their support of President 
Duterte and all his policies. There is a misplaced sense of 
pride as their view of patriotism is very limited; and 
misrepresentation occurs as the relation to the self as a 
patriotic citizen is narrow. This misrepresentation is also 
expressed in instances when the supporters encounter those  
 
 
22 Foucault, Hermeneutics, 376.  




who voice out their criticism of such policies. The critics are 
then immediately labelled as unpatriotic. Although the 
targeted netizen might feel good thinking that he or she is 
patriotic, the disinformation worker gains power over the 
netizen. By using flattery, disinformation architects and 
workers can make netizens dependent on the kind of 
discourse that they supply. It is likewise problematic on the 
other end of the political spectrum. 
From the content, there is now a shift of focus to the 
medium. Media theorist Marshall McLuhan sheds light on the 
post-truth attitude with the concepts of “the medium is the 
message” and the global village. 
II. Navigating the Internet Medium  
What does “the medium is the message” mean? McLuhan 
writes in Understanding Media: The Extension of Man, “This is 
merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any 
medium—that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from 
the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each 
extension of ourselves, or by any new technology.” 
Furthermore, such consequences of the medium or technology 
“amplify or accelerate existing processes. For the ‘message’ of 
any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or 
pattern that it introduces into human affairs.”23  
 
23 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Canada: 
McGraw-Hill Education, 1964), 9–10. http://robynbacken.com/text/ 
nw_research.pdf. 




The impact made by new technology is the medium of a 
moving target in which its users continue to shape and re-
shape each other. As with both Federman and Paul Levinson, 
the impact of the medium is greater, subtler, and bears 
unanticipated consequences over time. Using the 
McLuhanian lens, the kind of influence tackled here is not 
about the text, images, and videos but the internet itself, 
where all such content is accessed. In this sense, political 
discourse is to be reflected on from the change of scale, pace, 
or pattern introduced by the internet medium. To cite 
examples, the message of the medium of theatrical 
production may be its effect on tourism rather than the play 
or musical per se. The message of a newscast may be the 
perception on crime and the feeling it garners from the 
general public rather than the news stories themselves.24  
According to Barichello and Carvalho, “The socio-technics 
of the digital era inaugurate new ruptures between poles of 
emission (centralized within mass media), allowing an 
infinitely greater number of actors to participate in processes 
of production, distribution and content and information 
sharing.” 25  The internet and social media created a more 
complex communication flow by accommodating all into its 
 
24 Mark Federman, “What is the Meaning of the Medium of the Message?” 
(July 23, 2004). http://www.academia.edu/26657186/What_is_the_Meaning_ 
of_the_Medium_is_the_Message.  
25 Eugenia Maria Mariano da Rocha Barichello and Luciana Menezes Carvalho, 
“Understanding the Digital Social Media from McLuhan’s Idea of Medium-
Ambience,” Matrizes 7, no. 1 (2013): 236. https://www.researchgate.net/ 
publication/270643477_Understanding_the_digital_social_media_from_mcLuh
an's_idea_of_medium-ambience.   




fold and for the first time, provided an extensively 
participatory role to a historically passive audience. The 
ruptures from the advent of fake news are evident in the 
tensions between bloggers and journalists on social media. 
This influx of content producers and distributors triggered 
the proliferation of alternative sources of information. Hence, 
it gave way to alternative sources of news and, in effect, 
alternative sources of facts, which both set the stage for 
alternative facts. The competition between bloggers and the 
official account of established news outlets in terms of the 
magnitude of their following show not just a subscription to 
different sources of information but a subscription to 
different ways of seeing the world in a matter-of-fact manner. 
Tracing the key shifts in technological advancement of the 
medium, Paul Levinson alludes to the figures of the child, the 
voyeur, and the participant. The child, he says, is characterized 
by the passive audience of the radio. The process is one way as 
the listeners are not afforded any opportunity to answer the 
speaker they hear.26 The voyeur arrived with the advent of 
television. Fascination for the excitement of TV trickled down 
to politics as the glamour of scandals and extra-marital affairs 
proliferated in public discourse. It was with the TV voyeur that 
the love for spectacle reflected on the starry-eyed audiences 
and their hunger for juicy details on the lives of public figures  
 
26 Paul Levinson, Digital McLuhan: A Guide to the Information Millennium (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 1999). http://shora.tabriz.ir/Uploads/83/cms/user/File/ 
657/E_Book/Communication/Digital%20mcluhan.pdf.  




gained momentum. The third figure, the participant, is fully 
expressed in the internet medium. Whereas the two previous 
figures (the former docile and the latter eager) ultimately 
remained as passive audiences, it is only with the internet that 
the capacity to respond instantaneously was given.  
If the TV and the radio allowed the audiences to share the 
experience of listening and seeing the town crier, the internet 
took it further and allowed the townsfolk to respond, 
reconstituting the global village. Barichello and Carvalho cite 
researchers tagging the shift from broadcast media to the 
internet as “a more democratic and inclusive way of inhabiting 
the present” and a media of “dialogue and conversation.”27 
However, it bears unanticipated consequences. 
Unanticipated Consequences 
Breaking off from the one-sided communication of 
broadcast companies and introducing technology that caters 
to the multiplicity of participants as they generate and share 
content reflect the “more democratic” character of the 
internet. Seen in this light, the mistrust of authority 
characteristic of the post-truth attitude mentioned in the 
earlier discussion is now clearer and more resonant. The 
audience, having the capacity to produce content themselves, 
levelled the playing field with the gatekeeper. The nuances 
between the journalist and the blogger meet and clash within 
this space. 
 
27 Barichello and Carvalho, “Understanding the Digital Social Media,” 241.  




Due to the widespread accessibility of the internet and the 
proliferation of information sources, the blind side of media 
outlets in straight news and commentaries are well-covered 
by individuals who have the platform to share their views. 
The inclusive and thereby egalitarian environment of the 
internet provided the avenue for what Simon Ravenscroft 
refers to as a “wholesale rejection of authority figures.”28  
Facebook pages with witty albeit vitriolic monikers like 
“Crabbler,” “Abias-cbn News,” or “Superficial Gazette of the 
Republic of the Philippines” explicitly exemplify the 
predominant cynicism of their groups against their perceived 
political foes. Whereas mistrust of authority is directed 
toward particular organizations or individuals, willful 
blindness to evidence is directed at the contribution or 
findings of such parties. Hence, this brand of cynicism 
signifies a trait of the post-truth attitude. 
To “like” a specific public page or to join a group page on 
Facebook causes one’s newsfeed to constantly feature 
updates and posts on the said pages. To gravitate toward 
groups with political views results in a reinforcement of 
shared personal beliefs. Such gravitation not only makes it 
easier to form an echo chamber but also tends to instinctively 
antagonize those with opposing political views. The internet 
medium does not only accelerate or amplify the kind of 
 
28 Simon Ravenscroft, “Elephants and Cynics: Rehabilitating Truth in a Post-
Truth Age,” ABC News, May 22, 2017, https://www.abc.net.au/religion/ 
elephants-and-cynics-rehabilitating-truth-in-a-post-truth-age/10095770. 




thinking that people have such as confirmation bias or “us vs. 
them” thinking but it creates an environment that sustains it 
and is sustained by it. 
Being able to reply quickly to a post with an opposing 
political view is made possible by the immediacy of the 
internet medium. Oftentimes, kneejerk reactions spiral down 
to vitriolic comments. Such interactions, defined by the 
severe lack of understanding of each other, make individuals 
highly vulnerable to the emotionally-based arguments often 
rooted in fears or anxieties as well as appeals to emotion and 
personal beliefs.  
The “democratic” character of the internet medium 
eliminated the gap between the gatekeeper and the audience. 
It had an unanticipated consequence of allowing the 
questioning of narratives originating from deemed 
totalitarian-like institutions such as well-established media 
outlets. This articulates the mistrust of authority in the post-
truth attitude. Due to the scale of inclusiveness and 
accessibility of the internet, it granted a proliferation of 
perspectives bearing a certain brand of cynicism—one that is 
corrosive and dismissive of well-established media 
organizations and its findings. Like any other organization, 
mass media organizations are susceptible to corrupt practices. 
The proliferation of perspectives brought about by the 
internet leads to a healthy interrogation of such organizations 
and its practices. However, due to the amplification of 
personal biases and emotions involved in such cynicism, it 
runs the risk of a total rejection of verified reports and 




exhaustive research. Hence, the cynicism born from the 
proliferation of perspectives entails a willful blindness to 
evidence. Finally, the dialogue that was made possible in the 
imagination of a harmonious global village had the 
unanticipated consequence of bringing about polarized 
groups. The immediacy of the internet medium coupled with 
the harsh realities of the political backdrop made the online 
environment conducive to emotionally-based arguments. 
Pieced together, these unanticipated consequences make a 
conducive environment to lose control of the self and 
cultivate the post-truth attitude.  
It is important to recall how Barichello and Carvalho reject 
a deterministic view of McLuhan’s work. They write, “Digital 
media tools bear significant potential for re-creation, leaving 
possibilities for social appropriation that are much wider than 
in the case of other media, less susceptible to social re-
configuration.” 29  The medium not only allows us to go 
beyond specific human limitations as it extends the reach of 
experience of the self, but hints at a possibility to transform 
the use of the medium along with the self. 
III. The Care of the Self 
Confronted with the vastness of the internet medium and 
the surges of its content from disinformation workers, there 
is a need for the netizen to cut across its waves. Michel 
Foucault’s words on power in The Ethics on the Concern of the 
 
29 Barichello and Carvalho, “Understanding the Digital Social Media,” 237. 




Self as Practice of Freedom provides a sense of direction. Since 
power is the “relationship in which one person tries to 
control the conduct of the other,”30 it is embedded in human 
relationships. Power relations might be as apparent as 
teacher-student and employee-employer relationships or as 
subtle as the situatedness of gender, sex, skin color, or 
profession in a specific society. Power relations are always 
present because they are relational. In this light, power 
relations become “mobile, reversible, and unstable”31 because 
they are negotiable. The existence of power relations 
necessitates a space for freedom for it does not only entail 
power to control but power from control. Hence, this creates 
a “possibility of resistance.”32  
Such a possibility of resistance in the power relations of 
the disinformation workers and the targeted netizens 
(primarily expressed in disinformation) and the netizens 
among themselves (primarily expressed in misinformation) 
offer a space to respond ethically to the post-truth attitude. 
As such, this paper proposes to tackle the matter through 
Foucault’s discussion of the care of the self. 
In the Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault writes: 
The epimeleia heautou is an attitude towards the self, 
others, and the world; . . . [it] implies a certain way 
of attending to what we think and what takes place 
 
30 Ibid., 291.  
31 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. 3, 291. 
32 Ibid., 292. 




in our thought. . . epimeleia also always designates a 
number of actions exercised on the self by the self, 
actions by which one takes responsibility for 
oneself and by which one changes, purifies, 
transforms, and transfigures oneself.33  
Firstly, the epimeleia heautou or care of the self is described 
as an attitude. It connotes a pattern in the way the self thinks, 
feels, and behaves. The post-truth attitude is a force that 
creates a direct tension against self-care. The lack of self-
control ultimately affects how the self views others and the 
world. To lose control of the self is to lose control of how 
one views others and how one views the world. Whereas the 
post-truth attitude necessitates and perpetuates the self’s loss 
of control, self-care is an attitude that necessitates and 
perpetuates the self’s retention of control. 
Secondly, Foucault elaborates on what the attitude entails as 
he mentions “attending to what we think and what takes place 
in our thought.”34 This does not only include the thoughts 
themselves but how the self processes such thoughts. The 
approach taken by the self in the way it grasps thoughts is 
significant. To be watchful of what takes place in thought is to 
be watchful of the self.  
Thirdly, the attention directed by the self to the self includes 
an accompanying set of practices by the self. This is not merely 
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an intellectual exercise. It is woven as a guide for the direction 
of the set of practices. As will be seen in the discussion of 
askesis, the set of practices entails repetition or continuous 
work. It sets up how one “takes responsibility for oneself.”35 
Finally, one takes responsibility for one’s self through the 
acts of attention and exercises, by mathesis and askesis. It is on 
this note that the vulnerability in stultitia and the exploitation in 
flattery as well as their widespread presence in online 
disinformation and misinformation is problematized. To take 
responsibility for the self directly addresses the loss of control 
of the self.  
Foucault discussed the relational aspect of self-care in 
“The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of 
Freedom.” He rejects the notion that the care of the self 
could run the risk of dominating others as the process of care 
admits a management of power on relationships in a “non-
authoritarian manner.” 36  Ontological clarity entails ethical 
clarity. The quality of attention directed to the self then 
determines the quality of attention directed to the other. 
Simply, “He who takes care of himself to the point of 
knowing exactly what duties he has as master of the 
household and as a husband and father will find that he 
enjoys a proper relationship with his wife and children.”37 In  
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other words, the depth and clarity by which one is able to 
manage the self helps manage the relationship the self enjoys 
with others.  
Hellenistic Model of Care 
Foucault writes in the Hermeneutics of the Subject that the care 
of the self was made the primary locus in relation to the 
knowledge of the self. As such, the self is the “objective to be 
attained.”38 The Hellenistic model preoccupies the self with a 
kind of transformation that makes it the master of itself. 
Considering the individualistic tenor (tailor-fit profile 
accounts, newsfeeds, contacts, etc.) in which social media 
operates, retaining individualism and tweaking its 
preoccupation could be a more effective strategy than using 
the care for the community as a starting point. As such, the 
capacity to care for the community emanates from the 
capacity to take care of the self without making the care for 
the community the primary goal. 
The Hellenistic model was also discussed in Foucault’s 
Technologies of the Self. 39  Unlike the Platonic model, which 
prepares the adolescent disciple for his participation in politics, 
the Hellenistic model advises a retreat from it. The retreat of 
the self to the self is not to be taken as an act of cutting off 
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from the community. The Hellenistic model primarily, 
though not solely, preoccupies the self with its own lot, and 
hence, limits its preoccupation with what it has control over. 
Regarding self-care in the context of social media, the control 
described here does not force itself to cover a vast ground 
but dwells in a more manageable scope. 
Foucault refers to the Roman Empire in the first two 
centuries when he discussed the feature of pitting self-care 
against political participation in the Hellenistic model. He 
writes in the History of Sexuality Vol. 3: Care of the Self, “It was a 
space in which the centers of power were multiple; in which 
the activities, the tensions, the conflicts were numerous; in 
which they developed in several dimensions; and in which the 
equilibria were obtained through a variety of transactions.”40 
Imperial Rome’s conquests opened up the possibility of 
having more complex power relations through the interaction 
of people not only from nearby but far-off lands. This is a 
shift from the imagination of a community that is of a small 
city-state into a much bigger and open one. 
The opening of such possibilities mirrors the shift from 
the kind and scale of interaction allowed in electric 
technology to the digital as tackled by Levinson. The audio 
and audio-visual transmissions sent through the radio and TV 
offered a much simpler and smaller imagination and 
interaction of community. The internet medium, by virtue of 
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its participatory element, opened a much broader “complex 
space” with “multiple centers of power” dispersed across 
continents. The Hellenistic model contains a general call to 
both action and attention as it prescribed “a way of living for 
everybody throughout their lives.”41 It is a kind of self-care 
that is addressed to more complex and diverse relationships 
that lasts indefinitely. It is a general call to the citizenry as it is 
addressed to all. It is also a sustained attitude as it necessitates 
continuous work on the self. Lastly, it has an analogous 
context with that of imperial Rome given its “complex 
spaces” and “multiple centers of power.”42 For these reasons, 
the Hellenistic model of care is an apt model to use in 
responding to the problem of the post-truth attitude. 
The emphasis on character and self-control by the Stoics in 
the Hellenistic model offers a promising response to the 
potency of emotions and the influences magnifying it in the 
context of post-truth. The self-mastery that stands firm against 
the battering of fate could be of aid when confronting the 
self’s vulnerability toward disinformation and misinformation. 
Furthermore, the notion of cosmopolitanism, which cuts 
through the rigidity of tribal thinking and embraces humanity 
as one community, offers an opportunity to expand the self in 
its encounter with the reason of others. The post-truth attitude 
participates in a kind of conflict that is reinforced by both 
medium and content and puts the self in its own prison. 
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Perhaps when conflict is aggravated and exploited intensely 
and on a scale unimaginable to Roman emperors, Stoic 
wisdom could be put to practice—beginning with the 
exercises in mathesis and askesis. 
IV. Self-care in Practice: Mathesis 
Mathesis is the knowledge of the world.43 The practices in 
mathesis involve a process of establishing an orderly view of 
the world. Foucault elaborates Seneca’s “view from above.” 
He writes, “First, this movement is a flight, a tearing free 
from one’s self that finishes off and completes the 
detachment from flaws and vices. . . . Second, this movement 
which leads to the source of light, leads us to God . . . in the 
form that allows us to find ourselves again . . . in a sort of co-
naturalness or co-functionality with God . . . Third . . . we rise 
towards the highest point.”44 The flight mentioned is an act 
of breaking off from flaws and vices. It is to gain ascendancy 
and thus freedom from “everything that seemed good to 
us.”45 In other words, the movement sets the self on a path to 
question what seems desirable or empowering. 
Mathesis carves out a space to question the set of signs and 
marks of status displayed on social media. It interrogates the 
feeling of empowerment that the self feels in its projected 
image and participation in the platform. The affliction of 
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stultitia festers as the self is lured by reinforcing or 
exaggerating such an image through flattery. This is 
exemplified by the earlier discussion of netizens who identify 
with a fixed caricature of patriotism—that is, vigorously 
supporting President Duterte and his policies. The projection 
of patriotism can often be desirable and empowering. In view 
of the first movement of the Senecan ascent, the self puts 
into question what seems to be desirable. In this case, it is the 
fixed caricature of being patriotic. The act of tearing the self 
from the self necessitates a reassessment of the self’s biases. 
As such, it helps the self turn toward the attitude of forming a 
proper relation of the self to the self. 
Secondly, the movement that Foucault describes here 
proceeds to a “co-naturalness or co-functionality with God.”46 
The participation with divine reason as it orders the world 
implies participation with human reason. The self’s co-
naturalness with God extends its co-naturalness with others. 
This expanding movement of reason enshrined in the self and 
its encounter with the reason of others is vital in the 
interactions found in social media. 
Lastly, ensuing from such participatory co-naturalness, the 
self “rises to the highest point.”47 Dislodging the self from its 
own pettiness and narrow-mindedness, the Senecan ascent 
offers the self a panoramic view of the world. This view helps 
the self see its own smallness—its punctuality. Foucault refers 
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to the acknowledgement of the punctuality of existence as 
that which “enables us to dismiss and exclude all the false 
values and all the false dealings in which we are caught up.”48  
The first movement brings the self to question the notion 
of patriotism that one holds or is influenced by. The second 
movement allows the self to encounter other notions of 
patriotism through reason. The third movement offers a 
panoramic view of the self’s place and its notion of patriotism 
along with that of other participants’ in the digital world. The 
expansion of the self’s reason as it encounters others is an act 
of opening up to the human community vis-à-vis the self’s 
reason. Hence, this exercise loosens the grip of a group-
centered thinking and takes the netizen a step further to 
becoming a citizen of the world. In doing so, “it controls 
itself in its actions as in its thoughts.”49 Hence, by having 
encompassing knowledge and continuous contemplation of 
the events, activities, and processes on and by the internet 
and particularly social media, Seneca offers the possibility of 
constituting a self that has control over its thoughts and its 
actions online. 
Marcus Aurelius’s Plunge 
Foucault alludes to another Stoic figure in the discussion 
of mathesis. With an opposite trajectory to Seneca’s view from 
above, Marcus Aurelius plunges in. If Seneca’s panoramic 
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view approached the constitution of the self through 
acknowledging the punctuality of existence by stepping back, 
Marcus Aurelius shows a relentless intellectual dissection of 
the world up close. 
The first part of Marcus Aurelius’s plunging view “must 
consist in giving definition in logical and semantic terms, and 
then, at the same time, fixing a thing’s value.”50  Foucault 
mentions a gaze that is directed toward a “flux of 
representations”51 that examines its totality and its minutest 
parts. The flux of representations here is to be understood as 
the self’s passive encounter with its surroundings. On this 
note, it is apt to recall the ease of accessibility and the 
immediacy of the internet medium mentioned earlier. Given 
the vast array of content found on a newsfeed, social media 
users often find themselves absent-mindedly scrolling down 
and clicking from one post to another over extended periods 
of time. The focus of the platform’s design is to expose the 
user to as much content as possible. Placed in such a context, 
the kind of meticulousness involved in the exercise of 
defining and describing is counterintuitive as it is focused on 
limiting the attention and taking time to digest the 
representations that come to mind from an encounter with 
selected content. Since social media is a melting pot of facts 
and opinions, an active engagement would entail having a 
detailed account of what the self encounters in the platform. 
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This kind of meticulousness directed toward political content 
in social media arrives at a conceptual clarity. This kind of gaze 
is a crucial element in online discourse because it lessens the 
risk of misunderstanding between netizens and benefits media 
literacy campaigns as it helps come up with a methodical 
approach to the encountered content. 
After the intellectual rigor of defining and describing, 
Foucault introduces the exercise of seeing and naming. From 
a meticulous looking into, the exercise transitions to an 
exercise of looking in. It is a recalling of what was seen clearly 
and relating it to a particular set of principles. It is not only to 
meticulously name what was encountered but to name the 
principles on which one’s response is anchored. 
This is where philosophy adds to the skills-focused 
approach of media literacy campaigns. It goes beyond the 
meticulousness needed to sift through information. This 
exercise leads the self to go back to itself and ask how such 
sifting is done in relation to the principles that the self holds 
or tries to build and work on. 
The last movement is evaluating and testing. Here, the 
Stoic’s emphasis on the practice of austerity and self-control 
is apparent. The self is pitted against the event. Foucault 
writes that the representation is to be subjected “to suspicion, 
possible accusation, moral reproach, and intellectual 
refutation which dispels illusions, etcetera.”52 
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Part and parcel of this movement is the question of the 
self’s autonomy in relation to what was encountered. The 
thinking involved in the movement neither preoccupies itself 
with the facticity of the claim nor its moral implications. The 
purpose is to see to it that the self is stronger than the lure to 
passively accept or reject the claim. Whether or not the self 
agrees with the claim, the exercise puts into suspicion the 
position prescribed or taken. As such, the exercise of 
evaluating and testing ensures that as much as possible, the 
stand made on an issue originates from the self’s own 
volition. 
Decomposition Exercises 
The moral reproach and intellectual refutation involved are 
apparent in Marcus Aurelius’s decomposition exercises. The 
first exercise is the decomposition of the object in time or 
discontinuous perception. A feeling of bewilderment is 
evoked from the self when it hears a sweet melody or watches 
an enchanting dance. To dispel the bewilderment, Marcus 
Aurelius suggests breaking down the melody per note. By 
breaking it down, the approach lays bare the constitutive 
moments of its allure. 
The decomposition of the object in time offers a recourse 
to a simple yet compelling narrative. By cutting a narrative 
into individual moments, it unmasks its feigned coherence 
and leads the self to reconsider the story being told. This 
discontinuous perception dispels the bewildering bias that the 




self is afflicted with and offers a possibility of transforming 
the self in a space of freedom. 
The second decomposition exercise is decomposing 
objects into material elements. Whereas the first 
decomposition exercise strips the bewilderment of the 
melody by breaking it down to its notes, the second strips the 
bewilderment down to its material parts. A sumptuous meat 
stripped down to a dead carcass, wool into sheep’s hair, and 
copulation as a rubbing of nerves with each other, were the 
examples given by Marcus Aurelius. This is not only to 
investigate the representations like in the process of definition 
and description, but to look down on them. 
Consistent with the two decomposition exercises, the third 
is a description that aims to discredit. The description that 
Foucault gives involves the similar movements of looking 
into and looking down on that lead to a breaking free of. In 
this decomposition exercise, Marcus Aurelius shows a 
confrontation between the self and a powerful man. He 
wrote, “Imagine him eating, sleeping, copulating and 
excreting.”53 This is to remind the self that no matter how 
much larger than life the figure may seem, he or she is a 
human being like the self. 
Strongman, “Dirty Harry”, and tatay (father) have all been 
used to refer to President Rodrigo Duterte. In concert, the 
offhanded jokes, the incomplete sentences, the rolled-up 
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sleeves, the Tagalog-Davaoeño codeswitching, the no-
nonsense talk with expletives transformed the image of the 
“presidentiable,” the president, and ultimately, the presidency. 
The radical contrast to his soft-spoken and prim and proper 
predecessor has become an object of condemnation, ridicule, 
and to some, admiration. The candidness and lack of concern 
for political correctness resonates with the frustration of 
certain sectors with the leaders of previous administrations. 
The plain and ordinary language that he employs and the 
personality he projected during the 2016 election season 
conjured an image of a decisive and strong-willed leader. 
There is nothing wrong with tapping the support of people 
with similar sentiments. However, the danger lies in 
capitalizing on the charm of his persona that makes it 
conducive for his followers to lose control of themselves—
hence encouraging the post-truth attitude. The charisma and 
presence of President Duterte evokes the range of emotions 
characteristic of the aforementioned encounter. Such 
emotions need to be kept in check to ensure the effectiveness 
of the decomposition exercise. 
Foucault writes that the common objective of the 
decomposition exercises is “establishing the subject’s 
freedom by looking down on things from above, which 
enables us to penetrate them thoroughly . . . and thereby 
show us the little value they possess.” 54  The movements 
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present in Marcus Aurelius’s plunge as an act of looking into 
are enriched by the decomposition exercises as they add the 
element of looking down on. The emotional distance 
garnered by the common theme of suspicion and discredit in 
the exercises not only sets a critical view of what to think but 
how to feel in the encounter with the representation or online 
content. Whether for or against the self’s political view, it sets 
to question the predominant emotions evoked by such an 
encounter.  
The exercises under mathesis are primarily geared toward 
mending stultitia. Its repudiation of the feeling of 
bewilderment primarily addresses the emotional vulnerability 
of sincere political supporters who are intended or 
unintended targets of disinformation workers. With the flight 
that breaks free from the preoccupation of status in Seneca 
and the vigilant gaze pursued in Marcus Aurelius, an 
ontological clarity is arrived at and helps to address the loss of 
control of the self in stultitia. 
V. Self-care in Practice: Askesis 
Foucault defines askesis as “the set, the regular, calculated 
succession of procedures that are able to form, definitively 
fix, periodically reactivate and, if necessary, reinforce this 
paraskeue for an individual.”55 The paraskeue is a preparation 
for an occurrence that affects the life of the individual. The 
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paraskeue is work done to attain a stability of the self that 
withstands both tragedies and temptations. From the 
encounter with the representations or content online, askesis 
is when the self draws not just knowledge but a “supply of 
true propositions, principles, axioms, etcetera,”56 which are 
examined and reinforced to form an ethos. 
The amplification and acceleration of the internet medium 
of existing processes through its accessibility and immediacy 
makes it difficult for the self to prepare for its encounter with 
the content. The lack of preparation and thus self-control in 
an encounter with the events and the discussions that ensue, 
encourages a culture of misunderstanding rooted in raw 
emotions—a culture of post-truth. This results in the need to 
practice philosophical listening, philosophical reading, 
philosophical writing, and philosophical speaking. 
Philosophical Listening 
Listening is described as a sense that receives the logos but 
is inevitably intertwined with pathos, which “makes hearing 
dangerous, even hearing the word of truth.” 57  Foucault 
writes, “We can listen in a completely pointless way and 
without getting any benefit, and we can even listen in a way 
that is to our disadvantage.”58  The variety of the ways to 
listen should lead the self to ask what kind of listening the self 
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is in the habit of doing especially when confronted with 
widespread disinformation and misinformation.  
Foucault alludes to a general demeanor that safeguards 
against the sway of the pathos from what is heard. It is a kind 
of attention that does not concern itself with “irrelevant 
points of view . . . beauty of the form . . . grammar and 
vocabulary . . . and refutation of philosophical or sophistical 
quibbles.” 59  This kind of attention does not only pierce 
through the flattery-induced misrepresentation of the self to 
the self but also sees through the bewilderment with the 
speaker. Most importantly, the exercise directs itself to the 
possibility of transforming what is heard into a “precept of 
action.”60  
Firstly, the attention sifts through the kind of language 
employed as it turns away from the form of its delivery. It is a 
kind of attention that is not swayed by an appeal to emotion 
through a spectacle of sincerity (sometimes littered by 
expletives) by government officials. It does not blindly accept 
or immediately reject detailed expositions of issues from 
veteran journalists. The attention exhibits patience as it dives 
into what is being said and pushes out the tendency to give in 
to kneejerk reactions regarding how it is said. It suspends rash 
judgment on the crassness of the language employed by hard-
hitting supporters and gives them the chance to air out their 
thoughts and feelings. The diction, the lack of eloquence, and 
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bad grammar are not considered to have a bearing on what is 
heard. The mindful ear filters the irrelevant details as it 
persists to arrive at what is being said. In this respect, the kind 
of attention present in philosophical listening sifts through 
the kind of language that is employed and preoccupies itself 
with the question of what is heard. The kind of attention in 
philosophical listening addresses a dismissive attitude toward 
expletive-laden language. It leaves a space to hear out the 
genuine frustration behind an unconventional delivery of 
political commentaries. 
Secondly, the kind of attention present in philosophical 
listening sifts through the bias of the self with the personality 
or the institution that it hears from. As the attention helps 
distance the self from its misrepresentation to itself as what 
occurs in flattery, it distances itself from the flatterer per se. 
The attention directed is similar to that of listening to a 
salesman. The self is equally watchful not only of what is said 
but of the charm and influence of the person who is saying it. 
This applies to social media influencers who have gained a 
massive following online. The charm and wit of online 
personalities are perhaps a few of the reasons why people 
gravitate toward them. The kind of attention characteristic of 
philosophical listening dispels such bewilderment and strives 
to draw the essence of what they are saying. 
Lastly, the kind of attention that characterizes 
philosophical listening not only listens to what is being said 
and who is saying it but listens to the value of why it is being 




said. With the aid of memory, it directs the ear to viewing 
propositions in terms of “precepts of action.”61 It engages 
what is heard in terms of its prescription. A call to action is 
being conveyed in various degrees whenever there is a 
televised speech or political commentary on a radio show. 
Whether it is by an avid supporter or a vocal critic, the 
statements delivered through the airwaves elicit an emotional 
response geared toward a prescribed action. Philosophical 
listening demands a mindful reception of such a prescription. 
The ear stands guard as it listens to the assimilation of the 
prescription into the self’s ethos. Foucault detailed the work 
of attention as: “The soul that listens must keep watch on 
itself. In paying proper attention to what it hears it pays 
attention to what it hears as signification, as pragma. It also 
pays attention to itself, so that, through this listening and 
memory, the true thing gradually becomes the discourse that 
it clutches to itself.”62 
Philosophical Reading 
Philosophical reading does not entail identifying the 
credibility of the sources, the structure, and the tone of the 
article. Foucault introduced philosophical reading as an 
“opportunity for meditation.”63  
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According to Foucault, the meditation that occurs 
comprises an appropriation of thought and a kind of 
identification that results in action. Firstly, the appropriation 
of thought involves the self to be “profoundly convinced”64 
of a thought. It is repeated and surfaces as the need for it 
arises. This becomes a “principle of action”65 so that when 
one confronts a force that challenges the self and its 
autonomy, the self will be well-prepared. Secondly, the 
identification involves “the subject in which, through 
thought, he puts himself in a fictional situation in which he 
tests himself.”66 The notable example given by Foucault here 
is that of death. This kind of meditation does not entail a 
preoccupation with death as a concept but instead, assumes 
the position of a person who is dying. It is in this respect that 
the value of philosophical reading in the discussion of post-
truth surfaces. 
Reading on social media ordinarily involves information 
gathering and dissemination. It is seldom taken as an 
opportunity for ethical formation. Though it is equally 
important, this exercise does not help preoccupy the self with 
the accuracy of the information that is being read. 
Philosophical reading is not to be taken merely as having to 
receive information but to receive a prescribed action. This 
ethical dimension on what is read brings more weight to the 
 
64 Foucault, Hermeneutics, 357.   
65 Ibid.   
66 Ibid., 358.   




responsibility of reading. More than the accuracy of 
information to consume and to share, it tells of a precept of 
behavior to live by and espouse. As such, it is done with 
utmost care and caution. Reading an article either from an 
established media outlet or shared by a well-known blogger 
on Facebook is to be taken as an opportunity for meditating 
on the prescribed action. By assuming the position of what is 
read, its value is weighed and tested by the self as a precept of 
action. By doing so, the self can gain a sympathetic 
understanding of the writer of the text or the topic at hand. 
In effect, the self reflects on what is read, which the self does 
not necessarily agree with and considers to embed into the 
self’s own character. 
Philosophical Writing 
Philosophical writing has two uses. Firstly, philosophical 
writing benefits the self because to write what has been read 
is to reactivate its principle of behavior. It is to embed in 
memory and thus embed in repeated action that which is 
written. It thus becomes “a kind of habit for the body.”67 
Secondly, it stands to benefit others as the practice of 
philosophical writing involves correspondence. Foucault 
writes, “The correspondence involves allowing the one more 
advanced in virtue and the good to give advice to the other: 
he keeps himself informed about the other’s condition and 
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gives him advice in return.” 68  Placing this kind of 
correspondence in social media offers an opportunity for 
those who are more careful to reach out to those who need 
more guidance. Here, the relational aspect of the care of the 
self is more prominent than it is with philosophical listening 
and philosophical reading. In the process of writing 
prescribed principles of behavior for the guidance of others, 
the self also guides itself. Though the context of writing 
referred to here is different from the context of writing in 
social media, the responsibility for the self and others is 
unchanged. 
Philosophical Speaking 
The last of the techniques of true discourse which Foucault 
alludes to is philosophical speaking or truth-speaking—
otherwise known as parrhesia. The truth involved here puts on 
equal footing the belief of the speaker that he or she speaks the 
truth and its actuality. Foucault writes, “Parrhesia refers both to 
the moral quality, to the moral attitude or the ethos, if you like, 
and to the technical procedure or tekhne, which are necessary, 
which are indispensable, for conveying true discourse to the 
person who needs it to constitute himself as a subject of 
sovereignty over himself and as a subject of veridiction on his 
own account.”69  
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Philosophical speaking should not be construed as a no-
holds-barred speaking of truth. It is a stringent expression. 
The specificity that it entails does not only point toward the 
delivery of truth, but the delivery of truth in a specific way. In 
the earlier discussion, the facticity of the content is the major 
concern. In the parrhesiastic expression, however, the focus is 
not so much on the statement’s facticity as on the conditions 
that enable its proper enunciation. Foucault writes, “It is a 
specific, particular practice of true discourse defined by rules 
of prudence, skill, and the conditions that require one to say 
the truth at this moment, in this form, under these 
conditions, and to the individual inasmuch, and only 
inasmuch as he is capable of receiving it, and receiving it best, 
at this moment in time.”70  
By considering “the situation of the individuals with regard 
to each other and to the moment one speaks to him,” 71 
philosophical speaking offers a rich approach to the 
discussion of truth and thereby, post-truth. It does not limit 
itself to the question of a statement’s facticity that many 
initiatives have focused on. It encompasses the individuals 
involved in delivering or receiving truth, in what manner it is 
best delivered or received, and finding the right time for it to 
be delivered or received. Philosophical speaking is a carefully 
woven communication that allows the possibility of an actual 
transformation of the individuals who practice it. 
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The emancipatory goal in the practice of parrhesia strives 
toward a transformation. Its goal is to free the individual 
being spoken to from his or her dependency on the discourse 
given by the flatterer and allow the possibility of a 
transformation to an autonomous self. Through parrhesia, the 
speaker remedies the misrepresentation of the self to the self 
that occurs by being targeted by flattery. Philosophical 
speaking frees the self and others from a state of dependency. 
As with philosophical listening, philosophical reading, and 
philosophical writing, what is spoken of is to be viewed as 
prescribed actions or principles of behavior. Hence, there is 
again a sense of responsibility involved toward the self and 
others when one speaks philosophically.  
VI. The Care of the Self and Post-truth Politics  
The practices under mathesis that include Seneca’s ascent 
and Marcus Aurelius’s plunge offer a possibility of 
responding to the affliction of stultitia. Whether through the 
perspective of the highest point or from up close, by looking 
into and looking down on, the self is then able to detach from 
the bewilderment with “the passions, desires, ambition, 
mental habits, illusions, etc.”72  
Under askesis, the exercises of philosophical listening, 
philosophical reading, philosophical writing, and philosophical 
speaking allow the possibility of responding to the systematic 
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placement of the flatterer. By being able to engage with the 
text or what is heard, or what is spoken of in terms of 
prescribed actions and principles of behavior, the self can test 
its acceptability and reflect on how it affects the self’s process 
of formation or re-formation. 
The dynamic nature of forming or re-forming the self 
severs the hold of the post-truth attitude. The self does not 
attain a “full, perfect, and complete relationship of oneself to 
oneself”73 on a fixed point. It is a moving target and is not 
finished once attained. Freedom from the push and pull of 
misinformation and disinformation necessitates continuous 
work. Just like the never-ending waves that push and pull, 
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